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Abstract 
This article expands a keynote address given at the conference Ethics & Repair, 
Dance & Somatics Practices, at Coventry University (2015). Part One is an effort to 
understand a basic ethical tenet – respect of otherness – inviting an understanding 
of how to be with difference through a somatic sense of self as related, separate and 
in between. Part Two draws on this respect of otherness to offer a second discussion 
concerning dance training for performance. Somatic practices nurture an ethical 
relationship to others and the environment, contributing to physical and 
psychological change. Over the past twenty years somatic practices have come to 
form the foundation of contemporary dance training, disrupting competitively 
attained acquisition and achievement of spectacular technical skill. I Am Because You 
Are gives this dilemma in dance training some air space, to blow through currents of 
thought. 
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Introduction 
This article expands a keynote address given at the conference Ethics & Repair, 
Dance & Somatics Practices, at Coventry University (2015). I am interested in two 
linked discussions. Part One is an effort to understand how we might physically 
practice a basic ethical tenet – respect of otherness. I am exploring this 
philosophically and bodily, inviting an understanding of how to be with 
difference through a sense of separateness and relatedness. I am proposing a self 
supported separateness, experienced by giving somatic attention to one’s body 
in the environment, allowing us to relate to one another as the different beings 
that we are and giving space for something else happening in between us. With 
the basis of a three way dynamic of relationship: separateness, relatedness and 
in-between-ness I move into Part Two to offer a second discussion concerning 
dance training for performance. Somatic practices are, for the most part, 
considered to be ethical, for bodies and between bodies, nurturing a mindful 
relationship to the environment and contributing to physical and psychological 
change.  Over the past twenty years these practices have come to form the 
foundation of contemporary dance training. I am suggesting that somatic 
movement practices combined with technical skill-based dance training has 
instigated a dilemma, as ethical somatic practices can interrupt the competitively 
attained acquisition and achievement of technical skill. Given the title of the 
conference, Ethics and Repair: Continuing Dialogues within Somatic Informed 
Practice and Philosophy, I am opening up this can of worms again (Claid 2006, 
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2012, 2016), and giving the dilemma some air space to blow through currents of 
thought. 
Part One 
Ethics of Otherness 
Living ethically requires a respect for difference between one and another. I am 
seeking to understand this tenet from a perspective of bodily practice. How do 
we be with an ethical respect for difference in our bodies? How might somatic 
bodywork support us to transfer and translate ethical concerns for diversity into 
our every day existence? I begin this enquiry with an amateur’s curiosity for a 
philosophical frame, referencing philosophers Emmanuel Levinas and Alain 
Badiou.  
‘The Other faces me and puts me in question’ (Levinas 1999/1969: 207).  
Introduced to Levinas during my training as a Gestalt psychotherapist, I am 
particularly impacted by his existential, phenomenological, personally informed 
thinking on intersubjectivity. His ethics of otherness, a respect for difference that 
he devoted his life to testing, is a disarming of an identifiable sense of ‘I’ in the 
face of an other, whereby my responsibility to another pre-exists my right to be.  
 
For Levinas, ethics is the new name of thought, thought which has 
thrown off its ‘logical’ chains (the principle of identity) in favour of its 
prophetic submission to the Law of founding alterity. (Badiou 2002: 
20 original emphasis)2 
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In his passionate essay on Ethics (2002) Badiou places Levinas’ ethics alongside 
principles on which the Meta term Ethics is founded in the West. Simply, Man – 
as a consequence of His ability to reflect on life and death, good and evil – 
constructs, for himself, beliefs of Immortality and Universal Subjectivity and 
from his subjective position defines Good and Evil, where Good becomes 
Sameness and Evil is Otherness.3 
 
And this is why the reign of ‘ethics’ coincides, after decades of 
courageous critiques of colonialism and imperialism, with today’s 
sordid self-satisfaction in the ‘West’, with the insistent argument 
according to which the misery of the Third World is the result of its 
own incompetence, its own inanity – in short, of its subhumanity. 
(Badiou 2002: 13)  
 
Following on, it is a small step for Badiou to advance  
 
that every effort to unite people around a positive idea of the Good… 
becomes in fact the real source of evil itself... Every will to inscribe an idea 
of justice or equality turns bad. Every collective will to the Good creates 
Evil. (2002: 13) 
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I understand this to mean that whichever civilized community we consider, west 
or east, each has an idea of Goodness that all must obey and if you are outside 
that collective sameness you are evil.   So, otherness becomes dangerous. 
Against this western backdrop Levinas’ testing to unfix the monolithic concept of 
Identity is an attempt to undo ethics from its trapping boundaries of Universal 
Subjectivity, Good and Evil.  The problem is, Badiou emphasizes, because of the 
demands of western logic, Levinas’ ideas can become a jumbling confusion 
between philosophy and theology, a  ‘decomposed religion… a dog’s dinner… We 
are left with a pious discourse without piety, a spiritual supplement for 
incompetent governments, and a cultural sociology preached’ (Badiou 2002: 
23).4 In other words, Levinas’ ethics of otherness as a testing of new thinking 
about being with difference is submerged under the clutches of civilized western 
logic.  
While Ethics is contemplated at the level of logic and discourse Levinas’ concept 
of an ethical respect of otherness will remain a ‘decomposed religion’. We need 
to find ways to sense ethics bodily, bring Levinas’ thinking into embodied 
sensation, encountering how mind–body experience supports a way to be with 
the unknown-ness of one another. Moving towards this potential, Badiou 
continues saying ‘there is no ethics in general. There are only – eventually – 
ethics of processes by which we treat the possibilities of a situation’ (2002:16).  
This intimates that we might move away from grand logical Fixings and move 
into more fluid relations between things. I am implying that we do this through 
being with our bodies – questioning habitual movement as somatic practitioners, 
for this is where creative change potentially happens, right here in the meeting 
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between us. Not only might a body-based practice support each of us to live an 
ethical life, but also something else might happen in between that is unknown in 
the exchange – something creatively uncertain and logically impossible.5 
Developmental movements  
I am falling from the lofty abstractions of Ethics to micro embodied concerns, 
moving between philosophy and sensation.  Falling towards an embodied ethical 
process begins with a glance at early developmental movement patterns 
between carer and infant, a micro relationship, which Ruella Frank, Gestalt 
psychotherapist and founder of Center for Somatic Studies in New York suggests 
affects all consequent relationships (2001, 2011).  For here, in this primary 
contact, germinates a sense of self in the world.  
When we are born, we are dependent on others for survival and an emerging 
sense of a separate self develops through relationship with a primary carer. 
Writing this last sentence and thinking about how we embody a respect of 
difference raises a paradoxical question: An ethical life requires a respect for 
difference between self and other, yet how might we experience this way of 
living when, in our early lives, we are dependent on each other for survival and 
our individual sense of self develops through attachment to another?6  
Before a baby acquires spoken language, in the first year of life, her needs are 
met through movement, experienced in relationship with carer and 
environment. Body and brain develop in relation to others and to environment. 
During this time an infant develops movement patterns and movement memory, 
physical and psychological, that remain with him or her throughout life.  
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Using a sequence of yielding, pushing, reaching, grasping, pulling and 
releasing movement, a baby communicates what he wants and needs 
from his parents and expresses how he reacts to what his parents want 
and need from him…They are essential to character development in that 
they become the preferred and routine ways we dynamically adjust, 
making them simultaneously psychological and physical. (Frank and 
LeBarre 2011: 21) 
 
Somatic practitioners will be aware of these relational movements. I would like 
to draw attention to the first two: yield and push. This combination is integral to 
an infant’s relationship with environment and carer.  Through an inseparable 
Mobius-like bond of yield and a push with the environment we become self 
supported and, through a bond of yield and push with a primary carer, we make 
contact and become present to each other.  
 
Whereas how one yields with allows one to join another, how one pushes 
against allows one to differentiate from another. Experienced as an 
almost simultaneous shuttling back and forth between one and another, 
yield/push and push/yield are essential to and necessary for 
interpersonal meeting throughout the lifespan. (Frank and LeBarre 2011: 
27) 
 
Turn to face the person sitting next to you. Focus for a moment on your breathing, 
sensing your feet on the floor and your body in relation with the chair.  Aware of 
this support from the environment, slowly place the palms of your hands against 
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the palms of your partner’s hands. Gently experiment with yielding and pushing 
towards and away from contact with your partner’s hands.  Work slowly, 
responding to each other’s yield and push. Gradually let go of contact and talk 
together about your experiences. When did yield become push? When and how was 
your sense of safety affected by contact towards and away? When did you feel 
vitally present? When did you not? (Conference presentation task one)  7  
 
 
Uncertainty of consistency 
 
An infant has more chance to develop a sense of self in relation, when there is a 
consistency of presence – baby yields to carer who holds her so baby can push 
away. Yet even with the best parenting in the world, there is no certainty of this 
vital contact.  There is no certainty that you will be there when I yield, or vice 
versa. Not only do the events of every day life get in the way, but carer and infant 
bring to the meeting their own embodied histories. The other we are dependent 
on is sometimes there and sometimes not. Sometimes he or she is there too 
much and sometimes far too little. Each mother or carer has her own embodied 
movement history, passed on from her ancestors, life experience and needs for 
attachment. These are brought to the meeting with the infant who has his or her 
different needs and embodied dynamics. Ways of moving develop through this 
primary relationship affecting our physical and relational patterning throughout 
life. 
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Fundamental movements always arise in relation to the surrounding 
environment and, particularly in the first year, in relation to the parents… 
Parents actions become entwined with their baby’s actions … Parents 
express their own intention, attitudes, perceptions and feelings through 
their own movement… and all of these… are directly relayed to their baby 
through this moving dialogue. (Frank and LeBarre 2011: 23) 
 
The unpredictable nature of developmental movement relations implies that 
ambiguity and unknown-ness are inherent and integral to being alive.  
We are safe and unsafe at the same time; we need each other to be our separate 
selves yet our selves develop in relation. I am because you are and this is an 
uncertain existence at the best of times. 
 
We are dependent on each other for survival and that dependence is fraught 
with inconsistency. In western culture, living with uncertainty of relationship 
can feel intolerable. Hence the construction of Universal Subjectivity that Badiou 
asserts (2002). In western culture, feeling unsafe can come with fear of 
abandonment and death. What is at stake with feelings of uncertainty in 
relationship is that if you are not there, I might not be here either. No contact. 
Which brings us right up close to what existential psychotherapist Ernesto 
Spinelli would call a death anxiety . 
 
Temporal life anxiety seeks to point us to our experience of the 
fundamental uncertainty of being, such that every step we take, every act 
we initiate, expresses, at its heart, our inevitable movement towards non-
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being through unknown and unpredictable life circumstances. (Spinelli 
1997:1, cited in Van Deurzan 2005: 73) 
 
 
Fixing the other 
 
Rather than embrace unknown-ness and uncertainty of relationship, anxiety 
leads us to fix each other. We interpret otherness, making ourselves safe by 
fixing the other in our own field of understanding.  If I am feeling unsafe I might 
try to own, appropriate or possess you, or try to make you like me, attempt to 
shape you in my own likeness, or become like you. To rely on you being there for 
me I might hold onto you. If I cannot do this I might reject you. We identify with 
each other and interpret each other for ourselves.  We even keep each other alive 
when death would be so much preferable, because to face another’s death is to 
face our own. 
Face your partner again. Look at each other. Just look.  
Take it turns to slowly lower your gaze towards the ground. Remain 
with your eyes cast down for a while and then return to look again at 
your partner. Notice how you are affected, both doing and witnessing 
this action with your partner. Discuss. (Conference presentation task 
two) 8 
 
This experiment allows us to recognize how we tend to interpret meaning as 
something that is sourced in the other. When the person I am meeting lowers her 
gaze, I interpret her as unhappy. But it is my unhappiness I feel, not hers. We 
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tend to lose touch with owning our felt sensations that we bring to the encounter 
from our own backgrounds. Instead we transfer, project and interpret the other 
according to our pre-constructed understanding of the world.  
 
Within this operational field a respect of difference can become a fixed affair, 
identifying otherness as sameness.  As Luce Irigaray describes from her feminist 
philosophical perspective:  
 
In the attempts at individuation made since the dawn of ancient 
Greek culture, the subject has defined itself by imposing forms that 
framed pre-given matter and dominated it… Fixed by identificatory 
parameters, the other, with a benevolence that is all the more warm 
because it remains abstract, is summoned to come and join those who 
already make up the ranks of supposedly confirming human beings. 
So not other: same. (2004: 67) 
 
Fixing the other as the same is what Levinas seeks to overturn when he 
writes of intersubjectivity which is ‘not reversible, equal or symmetric… 
face-to-face is an intersubjective encounter where my response-ability for 
you preexists my right to be’ (Levinas 1982: 103).  If I come face to face 
with you, my life and yours become intertwined and harming you would be 
to harm myself.   
 
Fear for the other… is my fear, but is in no way an individual’s taking 
fright…Emotion therefore consists in being moved – being scared by 
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something, overjoyed by something, saddened by something, but also in 
feeling joy or sadness for oneself… There is a double intentionality in the 
by and the for and so there is a turning back on oneself and a return to 
anguish for oneself, for one’s finitude: in the fear inspired by the wolf, an 
anguish for my death. (Levinas 1984 in Sean Hand 1989: 84 original 
emphasis) 9 
 
Because intersubjectivity implies uncertain inconsistency that is inherent to 
relationship, so we incline towards fixing and interpreting others to provide 
safety and certainty. When we fix and interpret difference as sameness to create 
safety we nurture Subject/Object binaries and the fear of otherness persists. I am 
putting forward a premise that fixing as Same occurs when too much emphasis is 
given to the expectations of the other to be there for us and not enough emphasis 
given to self support, yield/push between body and environment. The practice of 
which is core to the development of a sense of separate self in relation to others. 
We tend to focus too much on expectations of others and not enough on self-
support – a relationship between body and environment, the ground. 
 
Accepting interpretation 
 
What if the first step to undoing fear of uncertainty of encounter with otherness 
is to fully accept that we fix and interpret?  
 
Gestalt psychologist Staemmler writes that because each of us is grounded in our 
‘cultural coinage, our personal history, our material conditions’ (2009: 20) we 
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cannot separate our perception from our understanding of the world. We do not 
perceive something without also understanding it as something. ‘Our 
understanding of any situation necessarily begins with a prejudice or, to put it a 
little milder, with a pre-understanding’ (Staemmler 2009: 85). 
 
Staemmler’s emphasis on awareness of prejudice emerges against a backdrop of 
an Husserlian phenomenological objective that to be true to the other, we need 
to bracket our interpretations, and eliminate our own modes of thinking entirely, 
denying our pre given prejudices.  Different to Levinas’ existential 
intersubjective approach to otherness, Husserl’s stated objective was to 
‘eliminate traditional modes of thinking completely, to recognize and tear down 
the bounds of the mind’ and to establish ‘an entirely new attitude which is 
opposed to the natural ways of experience and thinking’ (Husserl 1922: 3) 
through his method of ‘epoche’ and ‘phenomenological reduction’  (Staemmler 
2009: 71). 
 
Husserl’s bracketing or ‘phenomenological reduction’ (Husserl 1922: 56) 
becomes one of transcendence, the creation of a ‘transcendental ego’, a notion 
that one can ‘clean your mind of all pre-understandings’ (Staemmler 2009: 71). 
That somehow by transcending my own body and history, deflecting from my 
own affecting behaviour and thoughts, a God-like bracketing of myself in the face 
of an other, I will truly see the other as not myself. Staemmler is claiming that 
this is not only impossible but we risk extracting our human-ness from the 
encounter altogether. 
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With an emphasis on embodied ethics in this writing, transcendence is not a way 
to approach an ethical respect for difference, as the aim is being aware of our 
bodies and cultural backgrounds, when we meet each other.  The point is, to 
recognize that we interpret, and that this interpretation is co-created, by you and 
me, based on our embodied histories and experience. To accentuate earlier 
writing – if I see you yawn and fall asleep while I am talking, I might interpret 
you as bored or tired, while actually you might be just taking oxygen into your 
body. The consequence of my interpretation will be to speed up or do a little 
dance to keep you entertained. Catching The Simpsons (2016) cartoon: I watch 
Bart Simpson walking down a street towards a bank (money).  He is eating a 
toffee apple. There is a sign on the door of the bank saying ‘no food allowed’, so 
he puts his hand, with toffee apple, into his pocket. He enters the bank and 
everybody thinks he has a gun in his pocket so they cower on the floor, and he is 
taken down by a stun gun! We get the joke and laugh at our own mistaken 
interpretation!10  
 
What we are interpreting in thought and feeling is co-created, yet how I am 
affected is my response-ability, we each come to each encounter with our own 
experiential history. At each here and now encounter we jointly create whatever 
happens, from our separate and different experience and our togetherness, in 
the present moment.11 When we notice the fixed interpretations that we each 
bring to any meeting with difference, we might begin to shift the paradox of 
dependency and approach a place of curious dialogue.  
 
Self support, separateness and relatedness 
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I focus on breathing and allow my face a sensation of falling – out of dependence on 
you, sensing my relationship to the ground that supports me as I am falling. I am 
letting go of fixing on my relationship with you to support me; I am letting the 
ground support me as I fall. 12 
 
With this action I am demonstrating how I connect with the environment, as a 
key element of self-support. Falling towards and pushing against, I come into 
contact with the ground and I become self-supported. When I am self-supported 
I can separate from you. When I am separate from you I can see you as not me. 
This ‘I’ of relatedness depends on my ability for separateness. Separateness is 
possible if we support ourselves somatically with the environment. From here I 
might see you as different to me. I no longer need to fix you as the same; I no 
longer need you to fix me.   
Make yourself comfortable in your chair and come into your breathing. 
Sense your feet on the ground, how you can yield and push your feet 
into the ground and the ground supports you. Sense your back, pelvis 
and legs against the chair and as you yield into the chair how it 
supports you to push away.  Notice in yielding and pushing that you 
create a sensorial contact boundary between your body and the 
environment.  
 
Spend time here, maintaining this self-supporting practice and see if 
you can look towards your partner as you be with your practice. What 
do you see? Who do you see? Is what you see different now you are 
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focusing on your bodily sensations in relation to your environment? 
What do you sense in yourself?   What kind of space opens up for you in 
between you and your partner? This is your experience. Discuss with 
your partner. (Conference presentation task three) 
 
Embodied somatic support between body and environment (developing a 
contactful yield and push with the environment) encourages a self-supported 
vital presence with which to notice and respect differences between us.   
Gestalt psychotherapist Richard Hycner’s writing on intersubjectivity 
emphasizes separateness in relatedness. 
 
There are the two primary attitudes that a human being can take 
toward others. One is an attitude of natural ‘connection’ the other, 
natural ‘separation’ (Buber 1958). Both are essential. This often is 
misunderstood… We are always seeking a balancing point between 
our separateness and connectedness to others. In fact, it is the 
creative tension… that is the hallmark of healthy living. (Hycner 1995: 
8, emphasis added)  
 
Separateness emerges through relationship and is as necessary as relatedness, to 
open up curiosity and respect in a space between us for something else to 
happen.  
 
‘En-dash’13 
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Dialogic relations take place between you and me. This ambiguous, between 
space of encounter is where creative exchange takes place.14 The en-dash is a 
powerful symbol for theologian Martin Buber and his notion of intersubjectivity 
as a dual act of distancing and relating, separateness and togetherness when he 
uses the terms I-Thou and I-It. 15 
 
In his poetic writing on contact improvisation Williams (1996) references 
George’s article on ambiguity and the third state of potentiality (1988). 
 
All binaries are really hidden – and dynamic – triads… the crucial factor 
here is not how many ways two different units can relate to each other, 
but recognition that this ‘third element’ is not a unit but an axis, not an 
entity but a state of being, less a relationship than an act of relating’. 
(George 1988: 78–80 cited in Williams 1996: 25)  
 
I am because you are, is not about closing but opening a gap between us, a gap of 
dialogic creativity. As Williams delineates (1996), many writers name this third 
space. It has been called between-ness, becoming space, interval, creative void, 
filled emptiness, non-place, liminality, potentiality and dialogic contact 
boundary. Whatever it is called, and trying to name it may be a way to fix it – an 
encounter with unknown-ness between us, as an encounter with otherness, is a 
potential space for living change.  
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I will never know you, you will never be mine, and this not is what 
constitutes you as a possible you for me, as a reality or a being 
irreducible to my I. Certainly, we may sometimes merge in some 
fusional permeability, … in some immersion in a dominant culture. 
But the return to our difference will give us back to duality, to 
dialogue. (Irigaray 2004: 75) 
 
What happens at our encounter moves in that gap between I – You. That en dash 
between one thing and another, which divides and joins, where something else is 
suggested that is not either one, yet requires both is full of what is between.    
Part one of this article has emphasized self-supported separateness to encourage 
relatedness and in between-ness as a basis for an ethical respect of otherness. I 
have been giving attention to sensorial contact between body and environment 
as a potential practice, to explore respect for diversity and difference as a bodily 
experience.  Respecting otherness is between you and I and requires somatic 
attention to my body in environment, offering a separateness that allows me to 
see you as different to me and opens a space between us to explore.  
Part Two 
In this discussion I am thinking about how ethics as a respect of difference – a 
three-way play of separateness, relatedness and in between-ness – might affect 
dance training for performance. I would like to shake out some existing tensions 
between somatic learning and technical training for performance. I am hinting 
that the three way ethical process mentioned above can sometimes get lost in 
our well meaning care for teaching others. Teaching somatic-based dance 
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training often focuses more on relatedness, seeking confluence on bodies and 
between bodies, rather than tensions of difference. The contemporary dance 
community cares for its members, dancers improvise together, make 
performance together, share movement languages and collaborate together. Yet I 
wonder how much we engage with difference. Often we work in codes that are 
presumed between us, where respect of otherness is sometimes overlooked. 
Provocatively, I wonder if our care for each other tends to be based on making 
each other similar, over-riding the un-known of difference.  
 
Somatic experiments 
One initiating context for this dilemma can be traced back to the 1970s and the 
introduction of somatic movement practices into UK professional dance training. 
I have written elsewhere of the tumultuous affects of somatic practices onto 
technical dance systems such as ballet and modern dance techniques (2006).  
 
Back then, somatic movement practices shook traditional dance aesthetics and 
training to the core, for many of us who were silenced and/or injured 
psychologically and physically and unable to move outside traditional fixed 
codes.  Somatic bodywork saved and served us well: Mary Fulkerson’s release-
based imagery, Steve Paxton’s small dance, Alexander ‘s dropping and 
lengthening around a central axis, and Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen’s deep listening 
and sensing in Body Mind Centring. Somatic practice seeped through habitual 
thought and movement patterns through breath, sensation, anatomy, imagery 
and improvisational curiosity.  
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With the introduction of somatic approaches to movement in the 1970s, dance 
practice was no longer a hierarchy between those that could and those that could 
not. Dance was less about particular able-bodied people, or about physical image, 
there was no fixed image to produce, no mirror-based learning, no external 
judge.  This encouraged a socially engaged ethical dance practice – although 
enthusing mainly white communities. 16 
To begin, somatic work was internally focused and the work was about personal 
discovery as alluded to by Body Mind Centring practitioner Linda Hartley. 
 
When we practice on our own, it is mind touching body, and a similar 
sense of clarity can be experienced when our mind meets with the energy 
and movement of our own body. In this way the body is seen to be truly 
an instrument of expression of the mind.  (Hartley 1983: 13)  
 
 
This inwardly focused work was/is necessary for unravelling habitual externally 
focused movement patterns and begins a process of repair for dancers. In the 
1970s our need to look inwards towards bodily sensation was a rejection of, but 
emerging out of, a modernist enlightenment notion of spectacular stardom. Just 
as feminism, also emerging out of an era of Enlightenment, tended towards a 
search for essentialism, so somatic practitioners, tended towards a belief that 
looking inwards we might find an essential truth, or origin for being, a root to 
health and well-being.  We needed to look after ourselves. But we were not 
looking inwards to support singularity.  We knew, through somatic work, that in 
21 
 
order to begin to relate to each other and the world of objects and things, we 
must first (and continuously) sense ourselves in our bodies and in relation to the 
environment, the ground. So although our early experiments were inwardly 
focused, somatic work was/is never about finding a single truth on one’s own. 
Somatic practice is always in relation to our environment – sensing encounters 
between body and breathing, body and ground, body and body and between 
body and site. 17 
Teaching, training, learning 
Following the 1970s experiments, somatic movement practices were integrated 
into dance training across university, conservatoire, professional dance and 
therapeutic contexts, becoming core to movement understanding, nurturing 
mind–body intelligence.  
Somatic learning happens in spaces in between teachers and students as New 
Dance editor Jane McDermott writes in an interview with Steve Paxton in 1977: 
‘Contact is the only technique I’ve come across where the work is really the 
teacher’ (1977: 5). About 32 years later, Erin Manning, Canadian cultural 
theorist, philosopher and practicing artist echoes McDermott’s words. 
 
Relational movement means moving the relation. Moving the person 
will never result in grace, intensity of movement can only be felt 
when the in-between – the interval – created by the movement-with 
takes hold. (Manning 2009: 108–09)  
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Ethically sound, yet a dilemma emerges for those wishing to engage with and 
earn a living in, dance theatre performance as spectacle. This dilemma bubbled 
to the surface in 2014 when three leading choreographers, Lloyd Newson, 
Hofesh Schechner and Akram Khan raised concern over UK’s contemporary 
dance training. Lloyd Newson, Artistic Director of DV8 says of UK conservatoires,  
 
As leading contemporary dance companies, we would hope to employ 
graduates from these institutions, which are all in receipt of public 
subsidy as well as student tuition fees. Unfortunately the students, 
more often than not, lack rigour, technique and performance skills.18 
 
What part might somatic teaching and learning play in contributing to a lack of 
‘rigorous’ technical and performance skills for spectacle? 
 
To meet the demands of the production market for spectacle, with all its 
capitalist trimmings, conventional dance training has tended to function most 
successfully through hierarchies of teaching and learning where students leave 
their every day bodies outside of the studio on a daily basis, and consistently 
repeat movements that are alien to their bodies and repeat them until they are 
patterned and effortless. To earn a living in a world of dance spectacle, dancers 
must develop ever more impressive technical skills, to satisfy spectators who 
have paid money to sit and be ‘wowed’. Dancers train to become bodies ‘for hire’; 
they are trained ‘in order to make a living at dancing’ (Foster 1992: 494).  
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A somatic, relational teaching practice interrupts this process, introducing body–
mind awareness, sensation and presence and re-introducing effort into 
movement. Once this interruption is in motion, demanding a student to 
repeatedly blank out sensation in order to get her leg up above her head, balance 
endlessly on one leg or look the same as everybody else in unison, becomes a 
painful contradiction to somatic-based ethical face-to-face interaction.  
 
The elephant in the room (if I may use such an idiomatic expression around 
dancers) is whether a practice of ethical respect for difference and diversity is at 
all feasible within hierarchical working processes, production and performance 
of spectacle. Suffice to say, for now, as long as audiences need the reassurance of 
spectacular dancing – an ultimate fixer of relational uncertainty – teaching 
technical skill and producing spectacular dance will persist. 
 
Potential in difference 
 
What a dilemma! How can we be ethical and spectacular? Contemporary dance 
teachers have found ways of moving that combine the polarities of internal and 
external focus, and teach from a merged experiential place. Many teachers 
experienced somatic practices after years of conventional trainings.  I include 
myself when I say contemporary dance teachers hold embodied memories of 
technical spectacular training and somatic awareness on their bodies when they 
teach. This might be problematic when we are teaching students who have not 
experienced the externally driven push towards rigorous technical achievement, 
the highly competitive individualism of conventional training.  As somatic and 
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technical dance teaching gets jumbled up together there is tendency towards 
‘middle mush’ (Claid 2006: 140), in relation to spectacular dancing. Perhaps 
there is too much yielding towards and not enough pushing against. Somatic 
movement approaches offer remedy and repair for dancers and teachers, yet the 
same practices act as a rupturing virus for spectacular performance and training.  
 
The benefits of somatic awareness are many: furthering an ethical respect of 
otherness; offering physical and psychological health; undoing colonialist 
imperialism in our thoughts and on our bodies; furnishing actors with body 
awareness and grounding for body-based performers, encouraging 
environmental awareness for site specific performers – yes. Yet dance theatre 
training for choreographic spectacle requires externally driven technical skill, 
and is answerable to the efficient management and organization of marketable, 
economically driven performance production. Which is effectually an 
oppositional approach. Can training for spectacular dancing be ethical? 19 
 
Rather than merge these two polarities into an ethically sound release-based 
technique class (for instance), why not honour the polarities. Lie on the floor and 
do release-based imagery for two hours and do a ballet/Cunningham class – not 
one class that does both, called release-based contemporary!  Perhaps we might 
let dancers in training experience the polarities and sort out how these 
differences land on their minds and bodies. Trust students to make sense of in-
between, creating something else by experiencing the lively creative tension of 
extremes of difference. 
 
25 
 
I don't know…  What pleases me is not necessarily what pleases you. If I slow 
down to sense my separate self/body in relation to the environment, meeting 
you from this self supported space, I am more likely to notice how my 
interpretations of you is a consequence of my experience, not yours. I am more 
likely to notice and be curious about how your needs are different to mine. If 
nothing else, I am more likely to respect the vast range of styles and genres of 
dance performance that currently shape the world of contemporary dance, 
whether a massive dance theatre spectacle or a one-to-one intimate encounter in 
a library corner. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 A translation of the South African philosophical concept of ‘Ubunti’, relating to 
human-ness. 
2 Badiou is writing here of Jewish Law. 
3 Capital letters are applied in this writing to emphasize the so-called universal 
Meta narratives of these terms. 
4 In his essay on Ethics (2002) Badiou exposes how ‘apostles of ethics’ are in fact 
horrified by difference.  
 
Respect for differences, of course! But on condition that the different be 
parliamentary-democratic, pro free-market economics, in favour of 
freedom of opinion, feminism, the environment… That is to say: I respect 
differences, but only, of course, in so far as that which differs also 
respects, just as I do, the said differences… The respect for differences 
applies only to those differences that are reasonably consistent with this 
identity (which, after all, is nothing other than the identity of a wealthy – 
albeit visibly declining – “West”)… The truth is that, in the context of a 
system of thought that is both a-religious and genuinely contemporary 
with the truths of our time, the whole ethical predication based upon 
recognition of the other should be purely and simply abandoned. For the 
real question – and it is an extraordinarily difficult one – is much more 
that of recognising the Same. (Badiou 2002: 24–25 original emphasis) 
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5 See Williams (1996) ‘Working (in) the in-between’, for an insightful account of 
contact improvisation as an ethical practice.  
6 For attachment theory see John Bowlby (1969) and Daniel Stern (1998). 
7 The conference keynote address included participatory tasks, which 
complimented the content of the text. These are included as performative 
actions. This task is familiar to contact improvisation practitioners and reflects 
tasks given in somatic and therapeutic contexts such as Frank’s work with 
developmental movement patterns (Frank and LeBarre 2011). 
8 This is Task Two at the conference and is taken from Falling – A Creative 
Process, a practice led research project based on metaphorical, physical and 
psychological acts of falling (see Claid 2014).  
9 In parallel and referencing earlier writing (Claid 2014), intersubjective contact 
between self and other is socially described as keeping face, a ‘line’ (Goffman 
[1967] 2005: 5) of behaviour by which an individual is known in the world, by 
others and himself. To keep face is to maintain a consistent image of self in 
relation to others. You and I understand each other to exist through the faces 
that we show to each other and this line is maintained through our face-to-face 
responses. ‘At such times the person’s face clearly is something that is not lodged 
in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of 
events in the encounter’ (Goffman [1967] 2005: 6–7). 
10 The Simpsons is an American animated sitcom created by Matt Groenig for the 
Fox Broadcasting Company.  
11 I refer here to a Deleuzian sense of encounter:  
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something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not 
of recognition but of a fundamental encounter.  It may be grasped in a 
range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever 
tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense 
it is opposed to recognition. (Deleuze 2004: 139) 
 
12 I performed this action during the keynote address at the Somatics and Ethics 
Conference (2015). 
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dash. 
14 Important here is the use of the term ‘in between’, rather than ‘the between’, 
which as Gestalt psychologist and therapist Stawman points out is ‘ a “notional 
space” or “process” that surely remains, to the extent that it exists at all, beyond 
individual grasp… I can never step outside my experience’ (Stawman 2009: 20). 
15 Philosopher, theologian, political activist and educator Martin Buber 
differentiates dialogic relational contact (I-Thou) from an encounter where 
someone stands outside as observer (I-It), yet ‘I’ is always in relationship and 
both stances are necessary for relational encounter.  
 
The chief presupposition for the rise of genuine dialogue is that each 
should regard his partner as the very one he is. I become aware of him, 
aware that he is different, essentially different from myself, in the definite, 
unique way which is peculiar to him, and I accept whom I thus see, so that 
in full I can direct what I say to him as the person he is. (Buber 1965: 79) 
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16 I have written elsewhere about this white dance privilege (2006, 2015), how 
the issues for black dancers in the 1970s and 80s were very different. While we 
were busy undoing and letting go of fixed codes and identities, many black artists 
were trying to establish an identity in the first place. How can you let go of your 
identity if identity has never been recognized as yours in the first place? (see 
also, Adair and Burt 2013). 
17 See Miranda Tufnell and Chris Crickmay Body Space Image (2014) for ways in 
which body and object, body and environment interweave. 
18 http://www.criticaldance.org/2015/04/10/leading-choreographers-raise-
concerns-over-uk-contemporary-dance-training/. The morning I gave the 
keynote at the Somatic Conference 12 July 2015, was an article in The Guardian 
about this issue of training. 
http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2015/jul/12/contemporary-dance-debate-
shechter-khan-newson-laban-students-training. 
19 Whether or not dance spectacle can continue to exist in the light of 
collaborative ethical processes is a topical question within current practice led 
choreographic research, addressed by artist researchers and improvisers such as 
Michael Klien, Rachel Gomme, Efrosini Protopapa, Andrew Morrish, Kirstie 
Simson, Luke Pell, Susanna Recchia, Siobhan Davies and at events such as 
What_Now 2014 at Independent Dance. Particularly contradictory is the vital 
present time questioning that occurs in improvisatory performance forms, 
compared to fixed choreography, as sensational relational present time action 
and repeated phrases of movement often negate each other. 
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